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Emerging patterns in deviations from absolute priority rules in bankruptcy
Introduction
Reorganization is one of two routes that a bankrupt company may take.
Corporate reorganization is governed by Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and is an alternative to liquidation, which is governed by Chapter 7 of the same Code. Chapter 11 provides the means for failing firms in temporary difficulties to continue to operate after the bankruptcy filing, while claims are settled using a collective procedure. This system may make it possible for claimants to capture a larger value than in liquidation, in particular when a going concern is more valuable than a piecemeal sale of the firm.
Creditors and equity-holders of bankrupt companies are concerned with three important issues: i) the determination of the size of claims; ii) the determination of the relative priority of claims; iii) the division of the pie (i.e. firm value).
The size of the claims is usually determined by the managers of bankrupt firms and consists of an estimate of the claims that creditors have on the firms.
However, the use of the estimated allowed claims obtained from the plans of reorganization suffers from some limitations, as pointed out by Weiss (1992) .
These values usually rely on management valuations that the Court accepts unless creditors manage to establish another value through costly hearings. In addition, the values involved may be understated, as the Court might fail to provide the appropriate interest concerning time value, as it is the case of secured creditors (if they are over-secured 1 , post-petition interest may accrue and will typically be added to the claim). Also, the Court generally accepts management's view on whether the classes of creditors are impaired 2 , and so the creditors may think it is not worth the effort and cost to show otherwise.
The assessment of the relative priority of the claims is a crucial issue. The determination of the ranking of claims brings more clarity to the bargaining over the division of the firm to all claimants. In the empirical studies in corporate bankruptcy it is sometimes very difficult to rank the claims by seniority due to lack of information regarding particular claims. This problem might invalidate some of the results concerning deviations from absolute priority, as reported by Franks & Torous (1989) .
The key step is obviously the division of the pie. Reorganization can be thought of as a sale of the firm to the existing claimants. According to Bebchuck (1988) , "participants" pay the "tickets" in the reorganized company, i.e. claims against or interests in the new firm, with their existing claims and interests. Because of the 1 When the value of the collateral is greater than the full amount of the claim.
2 Subsections 1123(a)(2) & (3) of the Bankruptcy Code. This situation arises when any of the legal, equitable or contractual rights of the claim or interest are altered. So, a lack of an objective value for the reorganized firm, the division of the pie relies on a process of bargaining and litigation amongst the several claimants. Gilson (1995) states that what really drives claimants' returns are differences in the "true value" (of the firm's assets) and the "plan value" (used in determining the payouts). Jensen (1991) argues that the parties involved in the bankruptcy bargaining have no incentives to provide unbiased estimates of the true value of the company. Senior creditors have an incentive to underestimate the true value so they can get a higher proportion of the firm. Equity-holders provide overestimated values in order to retain a larger fraction of the firm. Junior creditors have more conflicting objectives, according to whether their claim is "in the money", when they have the same incentives as senior creditors, or "out of the money", when their incentives are similar to those of equity interests holders. 3 This process of bargaining and litigation is far from perfect. We see situations of deviations from absolute priority rules, where some claimants receive more than they should (and others receive less). These situations result for example from either an inaccurate valuation of the firm or a deliberate use of creditor receiving less than payment in full on his claim is impaired.
3 Using the options' terminology, a claim is "in the money" when the value of the bankrupt company's estate is enough to pay its holder in full. When there are not enough resources to pay a claim-holder, his claim can be considered as "out of the money". the power to delay the agreement that is held by some claimants (i.e. equityholders) in order to extract more value from the other claimants. This paper is concerned with the division of the pie. The first contribution of this study is to provide emerging patterns in deviations from absolute priority rules.
Using a large sample of Chapter 11 bankruptcies together with results from previous studies I can document three important empirical regularities. Firstly, priority rules are preserved in at most one-third of Chapter 11 bankruptcies, with equity-holders benefiting in most situations of violation. Secondly, even though deviations from absolute priority in favor of equity reached two digits in the first studies in the area, they have been getting smaller over time and are now of the magnitude of two percent of the total distribution to all claimants.
Thirdly, unsecured creditors have started to benefit from deviations from absolute priority, together with equity-holders, much to the loss of secured creditors.
The second contribution of this paper is to present a comprehensive review of the rationale for deviations from absolute priority rules, giving particular emphasis to the issues of asymmetric information and bargaining power of the debtor.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides empirical evidence on deviations from absolute priority rules, Section 3 discusses several explanations for the existence of deviations from absolute priority rules and Section 4 concludes.
How big are deviations from absolute priority rules?
The fair and equitable requirement mentioned in Subsection 1129(b) of the Code is usually referred to as the absolute priority rule. Jackson & Kronman (1979) argue that the expression "priority rule" derives from the function of determining the order in which all the creditors can satisfy their claims from the assets of their common debtor's estate. Under this rule, a plan should be fair and equitable even if unsecured classes of creditors do not realize the full value of their claims, as long as no class junior to them receives anything. This rule is however qualified, as it only applies when there is a class of claimants that is both impaired under the reorganization plan and has not accepted it.
Sample and Methodology
I provide estimates of deviations from absolute priority using a sample of 172 firms that filed for Chapter 11 and reorganized successfully (with either their independence preserved or were acquired/merged) over the period 1986-1997. 1) A description of the claims in terms of "secured", "unsecured" and "equity" (the latter one including preferred stock, options, rights, warrants and common stock);
2) The estimated allowed claims;
3) The amounts received upon reorganization;
4) The amounts that should have been distributed to all claimants, had the absolute priority rules been enforced;
5) The percentage deviation from absolute priority rules.
Deviations from absolute priority rules reflect the amount paid to claimants in violation of absolute priority as a proportion of the total distribution upon emergence from bankruptcy. If there are m classes of claimants, the percentage deviation from absolute priority for class j (see e.g. Franks & Torous (1989) ) is given by Equation 1, where CR are the payments received ("Class Received") and
CS are the payments that should have been distributed in the presence of absolute priority rules ("Class Should"):
CSj is calculated by distributing the total amount received upon reorganization first to the more senior classes of creditors and then the remainder to the more junior classes, following absolute priority. Finally, anything left over is distributed to the equity class. So, the formula for claim j is given by Equation 2,
where CE are the estimated values of the claims ("Class Estimated"):
The claims are in decreasing order of priority, where 1 corresponds to the senior creditors and m to the equity-holders. Table 1 shows a description of the sample employed in this study. In addition, it also provides details for samples used in older empirical studies in U.S.
Results
corporate bankruptcy, spanning the 70s, 80s and 90s. Some studies warrant a few comments, in particular those of Franks & Torous (1989) and Tashjian et al. (1996) .
The research paper by Franks & Torous (1989) covers both firms in Chapter 11
and Chapter X, the predecessor of Chapter 11. Franks & Torous (1994) compare distressed exchanges with Chapter 11s. Tashjian et al. (1996) benefiting from the tax savings of a Chapter 11 (again, see McConnell & Servaes (1991) and also Betker (1995a) for an empirical study). Table 2 gives an idea about the incidence and the magnitude of deviations from absolute priority for secured creditors, unsecured creditors and equity-holders.
The data is presented in a standardized form, following Equation 1. This means that in some cases deviations from absolute priority rules had to be calculated based on the raw data provided in the studies (see the table for more details).
Priority rules were violated in at least two-thirds of all Chapter 11 cases examined in these studies, with equity receiving some consideration in more than three-quarters of the firms with deviations from absolute priority. Compared to conventional Chapter 11s, equity deviations are not very different in pre-packs, but substantially larger in workouts (distressed exchanges), which supports the option to delay hypothesis (to be explained in the next section). Overall, though deviations from absolute priority in favor of equity appear to be the rule rather than the exception, these studies suggest that on average deviations are small and rarely exceed 10% of the total distribution to all claimants. 5 In particular, they seem to get smaller over time and have now reached just above 2% (using my more recent dataset), with an interesting feature emerging. Following the results for my sample of bankrupt firms, the bargaining seems to take place within the classes of creditors as well, with the unsecured creditors rising as winners alongside the equity-holders, much to the detriment of secured creditors.
5 Eberhart & Sweeney (1992) analyze deviations from absolute priority for creditors and obtain a positive 0.7% . However, because they did not take into account all possible
Explaining deviations from absolute priority rules
Deviations from absolute priority appear to be very frequent in Chapter 11, especially in favor of equity. One can say, using Bebchuk & Fried's (1996) terminology, that the current regime of bankruptcy implements a de facto rule of partial priority, due to a number of features of Chapter 11 reorganizations that favor the erosion of full priority of secured claims. The following subsections analyze in detail some possible explanations for the existence of violations of absolute priority.
Asymmetric information
The bankruptcy process suffers from a problem of asymmetry of information. The different parties involved hold private information regarding the value of the firm, and they do not necessarily have the incentive to share it amongst themselves. In this way, Franks & Torous (1989) argue that claimants' misrepresentation can be responsible for deviations from absolute priority. Eberhart et al. (1990) and Fabozzi et al. (1993) also say that the asymmetry of information in favor of the management can be responsible for deviations from absolute priority rules. In fact, managers have an incentive to overstate the firm value and as a result the creditors' recovery rates will be overstated too, if they consist of equity securities.
creditors, equity deviations might actually not be negative.
In order to receive some consideration in the reorganized firm, the holders of prepetition equity interests should persuade the Court that every class of creditors will get paid in an amount equal to the allowed amount of the claims in each class (see Conner et al. (1994) ).
3.2.
Recontracting process Franks & Torous (1989) argue that deviations from absolute priority rules represent a recontracting process between debt-holders and stockholders. The former ones recognize stockholder-oriented management's ability to preserve (or destroy) firm value and thus enable the extraction of value from the creditors (see Baird & Jackson (1988) ). In this way, creditors will agree to write down their claims and write up those of stockholders, in order to cure Myers' (1977) underinvestment problem 6 , and so increase firm value. This is actually in line with the going-concern surplus that reorganization tries to preserve. Such a position is also supported by Fabozzi et al. (1993) and Longhofer & Carlstrom (1995) 7 . However, Hotchkiss (1995) found evidence that poor post-bankruptcy performance is associated with the continued involvement of pre-bankruptcy management in the restructuring process. Franks & Torous (1994) found that equity's deviation from absolute priority is higher in workouts than in Chapter 11s, which can be explained with the recontracting argument. In order to avoid further value erosion, creditors are willing to give up more in workouts than in Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Betker (1998) detected evidence that supports this recontracting cost explanation. He analyzed both bond and stock abnormal returns 8 in the resolution month and concluded that they are higher in workout firms, which suggests that in this case there is no indication of wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders.
3.3.
Bargaining power of the debtor Franks & Torous (1989) say that deviations from absolute priority rules arise within the Chapter 11 bargaining process and the powers that the Court confers to the debtor-in-possession. Franks et al. (1996) argue that the source of deviations from absolute priority appears to be the bargaining power of the debtor (concentration of control rights) rather than investment incentives correction mechanisms (recontracting to overcome investment problems). In fact, secured creditors seem to face huge difficulties in forcing a collectively suboptimal liquidation of the company, which would grant them the highest present value payoff (see Kaiser (1996) ). The fact that the firm has a period of exclusivity where it has the sole right to propose a plan of reorganization, together with the preservation of the control of the firm, act as an implicit threat to impose costs 8 i.e. returns above the fair compensation for the risk involved in such securities.
on creditors. These costs are paid out of the firm's cash flows and are borne by the creditors, especially the unsecured claimants. Weiss (1990) argues that one reason why secured creditors may actually agree to give up part of their claims to the other claimants is the fear of losing additional interest or the risk of decay in the value of the collateral, especially when they are not fully secured (i.e. undersecured). This is basically an equity option argument, where violations of absolute priority reflect the purchase of the stockholders' option to delay the reorganization (e.g. delayed timing for new deals, administrative expenses), and so further costs are avoided. This reasoning can also explain why we should expect to find larger deviations from absolute priority in workouts than in Chapter 11s, a result supported by Franks & Torous (1994) . They showed that the difference in the deviations between distressed exchanges and Chapter 11s
provides an estimate of the informal costs of Chapter 11 reorganizations over distressed exchanges of at least 4.5% of firm value (upon reorganization). This argument corresponds to the incentive hypothesis of Fabozzi et al. (1993) , where the longer the negotiation process, the smaller the value of the firm to be distributed amongst all the claimants, due to higher bankruptcy costs. LoPucki & Whitford (1990), Eberhart et al. (1990) and Eberhart & Sweeney (1992) also appreciated the Bankruptcy Code features that give too much power to the debtor-in-possession. Eberhart et al. (1990) found support for the option to delay hypothesis. They first regressed time spent in bankruptcy on firm size, and then regressed the residuals from this regression 9 on equity deviations from absolute priority rules. The results, though not statistically strong, suggest that shareholders were in fact paid more for forfeiting their option to delay. 10 Franks & Torous (1994) found that the value of the option to delay is higher the closer the face value of the creditors' claims is to the value of the firm upon reorganization. Betker (1995b) also showed that deviations from absolute priority rules are larger when the firm is closer to solvency (closer to being "in-themoney"), which supports the option value of equity. Bergman & Callen (1995) support the result that maximum deviations from absolute priority occur when firm value is closer to the face value of debt. They developed an analytical model of deviations from absolute priority rules that illustrates this explanation. In their bargaining process bondholders rationally agree to write-down part of their claims in an amount that equals the potential cumulative damage due to firm value deterioration. With complete information the agreement will be reached in the first round, with no firm value dissipation. Inefficiencies will arise in the context of incomplete information, and the bargaining process will last much longer. This means that the key factor is the shareholders ability to cause deterioration of the assets of the firm and not the risk of the firm itself, which 9 Used as a proxy to delay, i.e. extra time spent on bankruptcy beyond which is needed. 10 The statistical significance of the estimate might however be understated due to measurement errors on the delay variable.
increases the value of the option to delay. 11 Bergman & Callen (1991) use the proportion of intangible assets in the total value of the firm as a proxy for the amount of damage that shareholders can cause, which reflects their bargaining power in the bankruptcy process. Bebchuck & Chang (1992) support the idea that the distribution that equity-holders receive tends to increase with the extent to which reorganization imposes financial distress costs, but, contrary to Bergman & Callen (1995) , they consider that the volatility of the value of the firm is a very important factor.
Management ownership
The dependence of the business upon the continuing services of the manager, also a shareholder in many cases, might grant him some leverage in the bargaining process. LoPucki & Whitford (1990) could not find particular evidence of the importance of this leverage that shareholding managers could get. Dufrene (1993) and Betker (1995b) suggest that larger violations of absolute priority are associated with management ownership in the debtor, as a result of the power that the Bankruptcy Code has granted them throughout the whole process.
Because of the possibility of this adverse management behavior, creditors discount the price of their debt securities, making the firm incur a higher cost of capital. This situation contributes to an under-investment problem which eventually reduces the value of the debtor. Coleman & Woodruff (1994) argue that directors and managers of a marginally solvent company may tend to favor creditors in the plan of reorganization, so they stay in their "good graces", despite owning shares in the company. This management may be problematic for shareholders, as far as objectives such as the maximization of firm value will not necessarily be followed. Daigle & Maloney (1994) were particularly interested in violations of absolute priority that favor the equity-holders and how they are related to problems of conflict of interests. They developed a model, validated empirically, that supports the fact that when equity has greater control of the firm's assets, the share that stockholders retain after bankruptcy is higher. This control is proxied by the ratio of current assets to the equity value of the firm five years prior to filing, i.e.
Control of assets
prior to the collapse. The idea behind is that agency costs are more severe when shareholders have greater flexibility in the control of the assets of a firm prior to financial distress, thus inducing debt-holders to pay more to renegotiate their contracts.
Appointment of an equity committee
An interesting finding in LoPucki & Whitford (1990) is that the appointment of an equity committee was always associated with equity interests consideration in the distribution, and this association generalized to other claimants, like subordinated debt. Betker (1995b) obtained opposite results. He says that a neutral or creditor-controlled management may explain the fact that the existence of equity committees does not seem to affect the distribution to equity. Franks & Torous (1989) say that the fact that judges might use (imputed) market values for liabilities discounted at the riskless rate of interest, instead of book or face values, could account for some deviations from absolute priority. Giammarino (1989) adds that the creditors' position in the bargaining will be weakened if both the creditors and the debtor expect this situation to happen. Warner (1977) complements this explanation by pointing out that the use of book values by the Court can be responsible for deviations from absolute priority, as far as the market value upon emergence might be much smaller.
Imputed market values versus book values

"Price of peace"
One alternative explanation is put forward by LoPucki & Whitford (1990) . Equityholders are automatically deemed to have rejected a plan of reorganization when they do not receive any payment. So, in order to have some participation in the distribution, they may threaten to demand a valuation of the firm, thus forcing creditors to surrender some value to them. LoPucki & Whitford (1990) and Eberhart et al. (1990) argue that equity distributions reflect the "price of peace"
and that contested and costly cram-down 12 hearings are to be avoided, thus favoring "consensual plans" 13 . However, the share that is given to equity might be somehow higher than the expense of litigating the valuation issue, especially because it might be enough to prove that no creditor class was receiving more than its claims, as opposed to the need for a valuation of the entire firm. Weiss (1990) says that the larger and thus more complicated the case, the more the opportunities for junior classes (equity-holders and some small groups of unsecured creditors) to benefit from the transfers of wealth from the more senior creditors. This is the strategic bargaining process hypothesis of Fabozzi et al. (1993) where the escalating complexity of the latest Chapter 11s requires more 12 The proponent of the plan may invoke the cram-down provisions of Subsection 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code in case any impaired class of creditors or equity security holders does not accept the plan. A cram-down allows the Court to compare the amounts that were granted in the plan of reorganization with the amounts that would accrue if the firm was liquidated in a piecemeal liquidation and absolute priority rules were followed. The non-assenting class may be forced to accept the proceeds that it would have the right to (according to the rules of absolute priority), had the firm been liquidated instead. So, claim-holders can end up receiving non-consensual treatment under a plan of reorganization.
Complexity of the cases
13 Subsection 1129(a) enables confirmation of a "consensual plan" if each class accepts the plan or is unimpaired, provided each dissenting member of every impaired class
receives at least what he should have got in a liquidation (i.e. "best-interests test").
negotiation than ever, especially with the increasing number of both official committees and financial and legal advisers. Franks & Torous (1994) also detected that the complexity of the bargaining process 14 determines deviations from absolute priority. In particular, equity deviations were found to be positively determined by firm size. Betker (1995b) however found no relation between deviations from absolute priority and firm size or other measures of creditor concentration 15 .
Bankruptcy venue
Weiss ' (1990) evidence suggests that it can actually pay the debtors to "shop around" and choose the jurisdiction they think will be more favorable for them, e.g. the Southern District of New York. Betker (1995b) however says that the venue of the case does not affect the distribution that equity-holders get, when other firm characteristics are taken into account (e.g. size).
14 Proxies included firm size, given by the logarithm of the value of its liabilities at yearend prior to default, the number of long-term debt issues and the proportion of liabilities in accounts payable, in the same period, and also the proportion of long-term debt held by banks and insurance companies. 15 Other measures of creditor concentration included the number of creditor classes, the Herfindahl index of creditor concentration and the percentage of claims held by priority, secured and bank creditors.
Preservation of net operating losses
One major reason for violations of absolute priority in favor of equity is the importance of a good co-operation of the shareholders so as to preserve tax-loss carry-forwards. Fabozzi et al. (1993) Code (IRC). However, the Code considers severe restrictions when we have ownership changes as defined by Section 382 of the IRC. In case of an ownership change, the annual use of the NOLs is limited to the equity value prior to that change (usually very small) times the long-term-exempt rate (around 6% -7% ). When the firm is in Chapter 11, these restrictions are generally less severe (the equity value is measured after the debt exchange) in case of an ownership change, as firms can apply for the Bankruptcy Exception of Subsection 382(1)(5). The least severe restriction takes place if more than 50% of the firm's stock and voting power continue to be held by its pre-petition shareholders and creditors (who must hold qualifying debt, i.e. they must be either trade creditors or have been creditors for at least one and a half years prior to the Bankruptcy filing). In this case, NOLs are reduced by one-half the amount of debt forgiven in the reorganization (net of any amount distributed during the reorganization plus interest).
An additional condition is that no ownership change should take place within two years.
17 Betker (1995a) found that the magnitude of tax savings could be quite different according to the restructuring process. He estimated that the present value of future taxes saved when a pre-pack is chosen over a workout is around $9 million, on average, or 3% of total assets. These results show the magnitude of the tax savings involved and one can speculate that if the manager has his interests aligned with the shareholders, he might use his power to decide not to apply for the Bankruptcy Exemption and so choose "to elect out" of Subsection 382(1)(5). In this way he can persuade the creditors preservation of NOLs hypothesis, where equity may get an important participation if the value of the Bankruptcy Exception is substantial.
3.9. Do secured creditors' deviations not exist after all? Beranek et al. (1996) detected no evidence of an incorrect application of legal priority rules by bankruptcy judges to secured creditors. They (incorrectly) claim that this is a central idea defended by absolute priority empirical studies (see Eberhart & Weiss (1998) for a defense of these studies). Their finding is subject to two conditions. Firstly, secured creditors may not be fully secured, i.e. undersecured, and so we have what under bankruptcy law is designated as a bifurcated claim: the claim is fully collateralized up to the value of the collateral, and the balance is a general unsecured claim. Because some disclosure statements fail to report these two claims separately, it appears that the recovery rates for secured claimants are less than 100%, which biases upwards the incidence of deviations from absolute priority affecting secured classes of claims.
Secondly, even when deviations have been correctly calculated, their meaning is to give some consideration to the shareholders, in order to avoid the general rules of Section 382 that restrict the annual use of NOLs.
18 Gilson (1997) 
Implications
The consequences of large deviations from absolute priority can be essentially two-fold (see Jensen (1991) ). On one hand, the junior creditors will try to get the most they can from companies in reorganization through a costly, long and conflicting, value-destroying bargaining process. On the other hand, ex-ante voluntary contracting will be affected as far as senior creditors would either disallow junior creditors in the capital structure or otherwise lend at very high rates. 20 These effects imply a higher cost of capital for the firms, as suggested by Shrader & Hickman (1993) , because the violations that cause the cost of debt to increase are not completely offset by the decrease in the cost of equity. 21 The higher cost of capital results from a greater degree of uncertainty concerning the value of both types of claims, and causes a reduction in economic efficiency, with fewer profitable investment opportunities and higher agency costs in the presence of reduced debt, as explained by Jensen (1991) . However, one should note that the priority rankings of the creditors are not lowered without their consent.
Bergman & Callen (1991) put forward an additional consequence of the bargaining power that equity detains through a shareholder-oriented management. They argue that in firms where the bargaining power of shareholders is perceived to be high, as a result of a large proportion of intangible assets in the total value of the firm, the debt capacity of the firm is low, and vice-versa. The managers of firms with a larger proportion of intangible assets are in a better position to successfully renegotiate away value from the creditors and, as a consequence, the firm can borrow less in equilibrium. Brealey & Myers (2003, p. 508) say that debt policy is indeed not completely irrelevant, as far as debt ratios do not vary randomly from firm to firm and industry to industry. Utilities, airlines, banks, real estate development companies and capital-intensive industries (e.g. steel, aluminum, chemicals, petroleum and mining) rely heavily on debt, whereas advertising agencies and drug companies, with a larger percentage of intangibles in their balance sheets, are predominantly equity-financed.
Conclusion
The Chapter 11 process is biased towards equity-holders, who typically manage to receive some consideration upon emergence from bankruptcy in violation of absolute priority rules. Recently, there is some evidence that unsecured creditors have started to benefit from deviations from absolute priority, much to the loss of secured creditors. In this way, the division of the pie has to be watched closely and more work along the lines of Bebchuck (1988) and Aghion et al. (1992) should be done. These authors suggest that in order to avoid conflicts in reaching an agreement claimants should be given a set of rights (options) that are a function of the (unknown) value of the firm, following absolute priority rules. These rights are designed so that, regardless of the reorganization value, the claimants will never end up with less than the value to which they are entitled, thus avoiding violations of absolute priority. Eberhart et al. (1990) 30 large firms with publicly traded stock that filed for Chapter 11 and reorganized during the period 1979-1986. Eberhart & Sweeney (1992) 187 bond issues from 74 firms that went bankrupt after October 1, 1979 and emerged from bankruptcy by December 1990. Fabozzi et al. (1993) 26 public companies that emerged from Chapter 11 between September 1, 1988 and April 1, 1990, with total assets of at least $25 million. Franks & Torous (1994) 45 distressed exchanges and 37 Chapter 11 reorganizations of large publicly traded companies during the period 1983 -1990 . Betker (1995b 75 Chapter 11s over the period 1982 -1990 . Tashjian et al. (1996 49 firms that filed pre-packaged bankruptcies from October 1986 to June 1993, where 32 cases are pre-voted pre-packs and 17 are post-voted pre-packs.
Carapeto 172 Chapter 11s over the period 1986-1997. a And also Weiss (1992 Weiss ( , 1993 f -0.9% in pre-voted pre-packs and 0.1% in post-voted pre-packs.
g -1.9% in pre-voted pre-packs and -0.6% in post-voted pre-packs. h 0.7% for preferred stock and 1.7% for common stock. In pre-voted prepacks, 0.5% for preferred stock and 2.6% for common stock. In postvoted pre-packs, 1.4% for preferred stock and 0.2% for common stock. Total creditors' deviations have the same magnitude but symmetric sign. This row does not add up to zero because of the different number of firms in each class of claimants.
